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KENTUCKY  
STATE CONVENTION.  
OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MR. R. SUTTON, CHIEF REPORTER.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1849.

[*Proceedings Continued.*]

Mr. MAYES. I am somewhat of the fact that the patience of the committee is well nigh exhausted in the examination and investigation of the important and interesting question presented by the motion of the gentleman from Nelson. This fact together with another, the feeble state of my health, admonishes me that it is altogether proper even if I was otherwise inclined, that in any remarks I may submit, I should be brief. In view of the case and the circumstance, will permit.

I had thought indeed when I left my home that the convention would have but little difficulty in arranging and framing such a constitution as would accord with the notions and opinions of the people as expressed in the late August election. I thought indeed, and still entertain the same opinion, that it would be no more than to do what the people at the organic law had been so deliberately discussed by the people, and so clearly understood by their representatives, that we would have but little to do here other than to meet together and to throw into proper form the amendments desired to be made in the constitution by those over whom it was intended to exert its power.

For now, I know of but two great and important questions discussed during the last summer, in reference to such amendments as should be made in the constitution. Those questions I knew were discussed at length in the part of the country in which I live, and from my reading and the evidence thus exhibited, I am disposed to suppose that there were the two great and important questions operating on the people at the time they called the convention. What were they? One was that the legislature met too frequently, and that out of that arose unnecessary and extravagant expenditures, which it was the great object of the people to curtail. Another question was, whether or not it was the wish of the people in calling a convention was that there should be returned to them the power heretofore delegated to the executive—that of appointing the officers of the commonwealth. The people claimed the right to appoint these officers themselves directly at the ballot box.

The question of slavery was never so ably and so ably and so ably and so ably discussed here never entered into the minds of the people as an important question until after it was determined to hold the convention. After that happened the question became an important one, and we have all come here, I doubt not, to express the voice of the people in the way of altering the constitution in relation to slavery.

We have considered the discussion here on the subject of slavery as unequalled for, and under the circumstances as wholly and entirely improper. I will remark here again, that many have professed to come here in opposition to the open clause or specific amendment, and why? Because they say if the amendment is adopted, it will be specifically amended, the question of slavery will be removed and distracted the country from year to year. Yet we have here from day to day, in speaking upon and agitating that very question, done the very thing which we would arrest by a clause in the constitution. Hence I regard that we have in our action on that subject been some-

one who get a cent for the constitution. Why, then, give the great changes, the important changes that it is desired by the people should be made in the organic law of Kentucky.

But the legislature, in the language of the gentleman, is defeated. The legislature of Kentucky has been elected by the people of the state of Kentucky. Now, I do confess that to me—although I do not profess to have much learning—this is a new idea. But I would ask before I remark upon it, whether there be in any civilized government upon earth such a feature as the gentleman desires to incorporate in the constitution of Kentucky? Is there in the constitution of the constitutions of the thirty states, forming this great confederacy, such a feature as the gentleman wishes to have inserted in the constitution of Kentucky? When, and where did he learn that the legislature constituted the people? If any department of the government has been heretofore unfairly condemned and repudiated to us a strong reason, and I think a good one, it is this self-same legislative department.—Why is it that the people desire that it should not be called together more than once in four years, or, at least, once into two years? Why, from the very fact that the people themselves have but little confidence in the discretion and wisdom of the legislature?

That, why is it that the people desire that the legislature shall not have the right to run the state in debt, without first consulting the people in relation to the appropriations they may desire to make? Because, from experience, the best of all teachers, they have learned that the legislature, on the subject, is not to be relied upon. They are not to be relied upon.

Then, why is it that the people desire that the legislature decide this constitution, for the framing of which we have been called together, shall provide for the protection and security of the common school fund of Kentucky? It is for the reason, and that alone, that they apprehend the legislative department of the government will be corrupted by the influence of the rich set apart, most sacredly, for the education of the poor as well as the rich. Sir, I know it to be the case, so far as the people I have the honor to represent are concerned. Last year, in my county, a large majority was given in opposition to the tax of two cents for common school purposes in the legislature. Simply because they had no faith in the legislature.

They believed the government, and believed they would divert the tax to another purpose. They approved of the common school system, and saw the necessity of education. They know that the very existence and perpetuity of the free institutions of this country depend upon the virtue and intelligence of the people. And yet, they have no confidence in the integrity of the legislature.

be contradictory to ourselves. I say that the people of Kentucky are right when they charge that the gentleman from Nelson has changed the constitution of the state, as the one proposed by the amendment of the gentleman from Nelson. I am not prepared to say that a bare majority of the legislature in all time to come shall have the right at its will and pleasure to remove from office the judges placed in office, not by the legislature, but by the vote of the people, given in a free election. The gentleman has told us to beware, to look to our constitution, and to be careful. It was to give a vote of that character it would be directly in opposition to the will of those who sent me here. The people desire no such change so far as I am informed, in the fundamental law, as the one contemplated in the amendment of the able, learned, and experienced gentleman from Nelson. I am not to be driven from any position, sir, I subject, deliberately formed, by the repeated declaration of the gentleman, to a table of self government. It seems that when ever gentlemen desire to press a question and to carry it through they get up and admonish us that the people, the sovereign people of this country, are capable of self government. Sir, this is the lesson, I suppose to have been taught us all from infancy up to the present time—that we are capable of free, this happy, and this glorious confederacy, are and ever have been capable of self government. Why, I have understood this to be one of the great and mighty principles for which our fathers in the days of the revolution, the times which tried the souls of men, and for which Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, and all the patriots of that day, bled. All power of right belongs to the people, and the people are entitled to and confident in their power, and the people themselves, the fundamental law, desire such checks and guards as shall protect them against wrongs and fraud, come from what source it may. This I understand to be the wish and desire of the people. Yet you tell me that you give to the people the right to elect a judge, and at the same time you say that a bare majority of the legislature, without cause, unless it be some political cause, shall have a right to remove the very judge from office elected by the people. I understand that it is contemplated, and I believe it will be done, that the State of Kentucky shall be laid into four districts, in each of which the people there residing shall select one judge. I understand, also, that the people of each district, that the convention will determine that the State shall be laid into two, three, or more or less, circuits, so that the people of each circuit shall have the power restored to them to determine who shall be judge in a particular circuit in which they live. Now, assuming that this change shall be made in the constitution, in the district in which I live, the people knowing the integrity, the fitness, and the worth of an individual in a particular district, select him and say he shall take the course of justice, and administer the justice of the land in that district.

Well, the legislature coming from every county in the state meets, and charges are preferred against that judge, or no charge is preferred; if you please he has been a partizan. The legislature had to framing a basis for any government. I shall be with the gentleman, if any essential change, which is desired by the people in their organic law, be made, whether the one particularly favored by the people I represent or not. I

for the new constitution, on the ground that the condition of the people will be bettered, and that one improvement, at least, on the subject of government, the most important subject that requires thinking, has been made. I am for electing the officers. I will sign and vote for the constitution, if that power be refused, and the legislative department shall be regulated as the people desire. I will not say that the new constitution may have to induce others to go with me. I think with the gentleman from Henry, and his very countenance is an index of his honesty on another subject, and that is, that it was made for the people, and that it is the duty of those that the votes in favor of the proposition of the gentleman from Nelson, as indicated in the house, will be few and far between. I think they should be few and far between, for if we have a government that is to be based on the foundations of the government under which we live, it does seem to me that we could not more effectually do so than by incorporating in the constitution the feature proposed by the gentleman from Nelson.

One word reference to a remark of the gentleman from Mason. It seems the gentleman has lived in different states. He tells us he has lived in a state where the legislature by joint vote are empowered to determine who shall administer the laws, and who shall not administer the laws. I say it was a happy mode. Of all the modes proposed to my mind, that by joint vote of the two houses of the legislature is the most objectionable. It is, in my opinion, obnoxious to the most important and powerful objections. I believe that the two houses of the legislature, when they will discharge the duties of judges, will do so with wisdom and fidelity. Where they have an opportunity to know the individual, the appointment will be a good one; they will select such persons as are worthy to be entrusted with the important intrust, which must necessarily be confided to a judge.

Now I merely desire to state why I object to the principle which is recommended by the gentleman from Mason.

The people of the county where I live, desire by their free suffrages to call in some man to act as judge; but you provide by your constitution that no man shall be elected by joint ballot of the legislature. What is the object of this? We have a certain man elected. A member of the legislature from another county, desires to secure the election of a particular individual to a similar office in his county. He says to me you elect a man, and I will go for yours. If there is no judge to be appointed in this county, there may be some object for which he desires an appropriation of money. The result is the same. We enter into an alliance for mutual support and assistance. No sir, it is one of the most corrupt and dangerous elements that can be made; and one of the very worst systems in our opinion, that could be adopted in any country. The stream of justice should be kept pure and unadulterated. The people themselves whose interests are so deeply concerned should be the appointing power. The people have the right of electing the best man that can be selected for judges, and they will take care to select such,

Well, sir, there is another point connected with the subject under consideration, to which I will for a moment advert. I think we were admonished the other day that at the proper time a motion would be made to strike out of this resolution the words, "and of good moral qualification shall be required of those who present themselves for election to the office of judge. The propriety of such a provision has been already adverted to by some gentlemen who have taken part in this discussion; and for myself, sir, I give notice now that I am in favour of such a motion, for protecting the people against imposition and fraud. No man should receive the appointment of judge who is not learned in the law, and who is not in all respects properly qualified to discharge the duties appertaining to the office. Being learned in the law is, I apprehend, a very essential qualification, and there ought to be some mode of determining the fact. I think that *prima facie* evidence that you have seen him engaged in the practice of the law. It must be evident to gentlemen that it is desirable that the candidate for judgeship should be able to certify the electors of his qualifications. This must strike gentlemen as being necessary and proper for the benefit of the community, that the people may know into whose interests and interests are to be intrusted.

Gentlemen agree that there ought to be a certain age fixed at which man may be elevated to the bench; and another requirement should be a certain number of years' practice at the bar before he is made eligible. But, gentlemen say, the people are capable of self-government, and in consequence, the people are the basis of self-government, no qualification is necessary to be fixed for those who are to hold office and appointment by the people. Without the insertion of these provisions, I think gentlemen will find that their constituents will not be satisfied. I told the people in the county where I live, that I was in favor of the constitution of I should be in favor of these tests of qualification, in reference to the judges, and also in reference to the clerks of courts. But when a man presents himself before the people for the station of judge, the mere presentation of a certificate will not be sufficient evidence of his fitness, that is, that he is a competent man, that there was a time when in Tennessee there was no test, I believe, required on the part of a candidate for a clerkship. Well, sir, the fact came under my own observation in relation to the conduct of a clerk—it may be an extreme case, but still many such cases have occurred, and I think it is not to be conclusively how far we may be from shielding and protecting the rights of those whom the gentleman so fondly calls the people, if we adopt this constitution, and permit A. B. or C. D. whether ten years of age or older, whether instructed in the duties of the office, or not, to be elevated to the station of clerk, and the man who can best flatter the people is the man who will be most successful. He will be certain to be elected without any test or qualification. This will be but opening the door for the demagogue—the man who loves himself better than he loves the dear people.

Q. And the record of one of the counties of Tennessee, I sent to the clerk of that county for a copy. What think you the clerk did? Instead of sending a copy of the record, he was so well qualified for the high station he occupied, he was so well informed of his duties, that instead of the record he sent an entire,

different doors. That clerk was elected under this system, and will be spoken, without any qualification, or fitness for office. And I will tell you how it happened that he was elected. I am but a poor historian, but will give you an outline of the case. There was a man living in Florida; this man started for the war, but he did not see the service. The circumstance of his having started, however, gave him so much popularity that they made him clerk. Why, the very rights of the people themselves depend upon the qualification of the public officers. They are capable of judging of the qualification and fitness of candidates for office, when they have the means within their power; but if you withhold from the people the means of judging, it is not fair to expect that they will make suitable selections. How, then, can it make common sense, can the people elect a proper officer, unless they have the means of judging of his qualifications? Will they vote for a man whom they have no way of knowing or another? Very likely they will vote for the case as that of the clerk of the court in Tennessee.

see, to whom I have referred, who had started for the Florida war, and thus had acquired a degree of popularity.

But it is the duty of this convention to provide the means of judging of the qualification and fitness of candidates for office. The people are not to be deceived by flattery, by being told they are capable of self-government. That is an axiom of the truth of which they are well satisfied. The feature which the committee desire to have retained in the constitution, is the very one which the people want. Strike that feature from the constitution, and they will have no guard to their security, for the proper discharge of the duties of the judicial officer. It is that feature which they desire should be retained, so far as I am acquainted with the wishes of the people.

If the legislature are the people, why may we not with equal propriety, say that the judges are the people? The members of the legislature, according to my apprehension, are agents of the people, and they are agents who frequently abuse their trust. The judges, over whom the legislature sit as a kind of inquisition, judge themselves, and are agents of the people. Let the people elect their judges. Let the people elect every officer, from the judge of the court of appeals, or from the executive down to a constable. Every officer of the government is an agent of the people. Does it follow that he is the people? But gentlemen tell me that a majority of the legislature ought to have the right to determine for every district in the State the number of judges, and who shall not sit in this tribunal?

The first proposition I can never agree.  
 I say, I cannot agree, because I do not rise to make a  
 speech, but I want the opportunity to present one or two,  
 of the honorable delegate from the State of New York,  
 Nelson, and I also, for a very few moments, de-  
 sire the attention of the members of this con-  
 vention, and your own. There are two propo-  
 sitions that were made by the gentleman from  
 Nelson, and provided such explanations are  
 given by him, as I have no doubt he is fully ca-  
 pable of giving, and such promises are made by  
 him, as he is fully capable of complying with;  
 if these explanations and promises are given to  
 myself and the committee, I shall vote for the  
 first proposition, but otherwise I shall not vote for  
 it, and I believe I shall not vote for it.  
 For the second proposition I shall not vote on  
 any account, whatever, for the reasons which

have been given in by gentlemen in the past. I have participated in this discussion, which reasons I will not repeat, because it is not worth while to repeat what has been better said by others. But as no gentleman has turned his attention to the first proposition, I desire to advert to it for a moment, for I consider it of the utmost importance. I consider it of the utmost importance in favor of, if we can carry through the whole constitution. But I am not willing, and I do not believe that a solitary member of this committee is willing, to adopt that principle in this particular place, unless it can be carried through the whole constitution. We are all aware that the constitution should be very carefully carried that all the parts of the constitution harmonize—that they shall not only fit well together, but work well together, and that no one

part of the machinery shall conflict with another. The proposition to which I now refer, is that for striking out the words, "which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment." If it be intended to retain in the new constitution the whole of the fifth article of the old constitution, these words ought to be stricken out. I see around me several gentlemen who were members of the convention of 1820. The gentleman from Henry is one of them, and the gentleman from Nelson, Mr. Hardin, is another. The first gentleman has declared that he has travelled in his literary researches as far as Dilworth, and the other gentleman has advanced as far as words of three syllables; but these gentlemen, if they have not read their political spelling book, have at least read the book of mankind, and they know

that it is to the people expect. They know, or ought to know, that every species of special pleading should be avoided in a document of this kind; that it is necessary that we should make good meaning, and that we should do so as possible for legislative or judicial construction. What we do I want to do so plainly, that the different departments of the government may not only read it as they run, but understand it well and easily. Now, leave this clause as it stands, without striking out the words referred to, and the construction will occur naturally. There is a certain class of men who, amounting to misfeance, others to misfeasance, and others to nonfeasance in office. A man has done a particular thing that he ought not to do, or he has omitted to do a thing he ought to do, about which acts there may be cavilling as to whether they fall under the class of cases to which impeachment applies, or not. I know on one occasion such a question saved a man from being turned out of office. It opens a door by which men of tender consciences evade the responsibility of voting directly upon the question of a man's culpability. It raises a doubt by which men of strong consciences, or no consciences at all, can evade the responsibility of a decided vote. I will put it in legal phrase, which will be intelligible to every body. They demur to the case set out on the motion for the address, on this ground—that it is not cause for address, but cause for impeachment, and that you must not put it in the form of an address. Why? Because it is a higher, a more shocking crime, than that which, by the constitution of the State, is authorized to be made cause of removal by address.

I acknowledge, sir, that this is a very strange reason, and it would be a strange reason to an undisciplined mind; but the greater should always include the less, and if the judge had committed treason, larceny, or arson, or any criminal offense, and if you were to say to him, "You are satisfied of his guilt, yet one of your oaths of tender conscience may say it is not good cause for removal by address. I want to get rid of this objection. Gentlemen can imagine a thousand different cases in which this objection would be applicable, and you would have the power of impeachment, put in the necessary words for that purpose and you will have all that I aim at, and that is, when a civil officer of the government has been guilty of such high crimes and

use means as to require impeachment, impeach him if you think proper, but impeachment is a matter for the country, and is almost unnecessary, and indeed almost impracticable. If a judge fail to attend court for such a length of time as to make it evident to the legislature that his conduct amounts to nonfeasance in office, it might be cause for impeachment, provided sickness or other legitimate reasons for absence be proved. If a judge should fail to remove him by address, although his absence had been occasioned by sickness or physical disability. Retain then the 5th article of the old constitution, and add to it, and every evil or inconvenience that has been predicted will be avoided. I cannot agree to go so far, as to strike out the 5th article of the old constitution, and put that question at present, I will only ask the gentleman from Nelson, when he comes to reply to the arguments that have been advanced against his proposition, to answer this solitary question: was not the two thirds principle originally inserted in the constitution of this State, and in the constitution of the United States, a matter of compromise between requiring the verdict of the whole jury to decide the facts on one side, and the majority of the court to decide the law on the other, and whether when the legislature meets and has to remove a man by address, they are not occupying the position of a jury to decide the facts, and the court to decide the law, — whether this principle was not put in as a compromise in consequence of the mixture of the

character of the court, having to decide touching the law and the facts—between the two extremes, of requiring only a bare majority of the court on one side and the whole of the jury on the other? Has it not worked well? Tell me a solitary instance where it has failed upon address, although gentlemen can find a hundred instances where it has failed by impeachment. There is the point. I am in favor of striking out the words proposed to be stricken out.

I am averse to detaining the committee longer, for there are many gentlemen who are desirous of giving their views, and who seem to think our sittings are too brief. My own opinion is that we would get along faster, if we were to allow the committee to

Mr. C. A. WICKLIFFE. I will state briefly what the views of the committee were. They in the first place, believed differently from the gentleman from Daviess, that no officer should be removed by address or impeachment upon mere rumor. I understand the gentleman to state that cases might arise, cases of high crimes and misdemeanors, and although the legislature may be satisfied that the crimes were committed, yet in the absence of direct proof of the fact the party cannot be removed.

Mr. TRIPETT. As this is a matter of importance, I wish it to be clearly understood. What I wish to know is, whether it is intended by the committee that an officer shall be removed on a presumption which is not a fact to be proved by testimony. Let this be clearly understood. It is one thing to remove a man on a presumption; it is quite another to remove the judge upon facts that require the testimony of witnesses, in the name of Heaven go through with the address in the same manner as you would with an impeachment. Give the accused notice in writing of all the facts you intend to prove against him. Let him be allowed to employ counsel of his own choice, and let him produce witnesses for his defence. Give him the benefit of all the means of defence when you propose to remove him by address, the same as you would if the form of proceeding was by impeachment. I desire to ask both the gentlemen from New York and from New Jersey, whether they are the other chairman of the committee, whether if you retain the fifth article, you intend to grant to the judge under the address all the means of defence that he would be entitled to under impeachment. If you do this, you will have made

most salutary reform.

MR. C. A. WICKLIFFE. I think that I did not misunderstand my honorable friend. The objection of the gentleman is, that the close of the officer, but also to disqualify him for the future from holding office in the community. The committee did not design, in giving the right to the legislature to remove by address, requiring the usual number—two thirds—to lessen the rights of the accused or to enlarge the privileges of the accuser—the commonwealth. That no man should be removed unless there be sufficient proof of the charges against him, and that he should be removed upon a charge which is but partly proved. If I understand my honorable friend, his objection was, that for any offence which was punishable by impeachment, the triers of that impeachment, when called to exercise their functions under the solemnity of an oath recently administered, would, like a jury, require proof before they would convict the individual. If he may be guilty, says the gentleman, and that is not sufficient proof to satisfy a court, or the constituted tribunal, yet enough to satisfy the minds of the people, and that you will convict him upon mere rumor propagated by his enemies. That is the gentleman's position if I understand it. The gentleman divides the offences for which officers may be removed into two classes—into such as are *malæ in se*, and such as do not amount to crimes. It is upon this latter class that the removing power by the legislature is to operate, and such as of trials or misdemeanors, the mode of proceeding is by impeachment, therefore I was in favor of retaining the impeaching power.

Mr. TRIPPLETT. Sir, although I know there is an impropriety in this conversational mode of debate, yet I must be excused for a single moment. No man supposes that it was intended that an officer should be tried without an oath on the part of those who try him, and notice of the accusation that is made against him. I cannot believe that my honorable friend from Nelson is so unskilful as to compare this to a trial by battle. Suppose the judge gives a decision which is so manifestly erroneous, that you see he is incompetent to discharge the duties of his station, then you want no testimony to prove the fact. It is matter of record. But when you accuse him of felony, when you accuse him of any crime, then it is necessary not only that you give him notice of the accusation, but that the senate shall be sworn as well as the lower house. All these things might confuse the minds of a jury, but they cannot confuse the senate. There is a difference between a jury and a senate. The gentlemen around me, this convulses me, convince me that they cannot be confused. Why then go another step and say they shall be newly sworn? Swear them every morning if you wish. That does not touch the point of my argument. This thing of removing men by address is a serious matter, but it is one which becomes necessary sometimes, and shall we not take the trouble to lay down the necessary preliminaries so that it may be done correctly? It is only writing a few lines further, and saying at the bottom of a paragraph, that the gentleman sitting and adjudicating upon an address shall be sworn, and prescribe the form of oath. I think the proposition made by the gentleman from Nelson (Mr. Hardin,) ought to succeed, provided it is particularly guarded, and I leave in his able hands the duty of properly guarding it.

MR. HARDIN. Were it not that an expectation is entertained in this house that I should make some reply to what has been said in opposition to the proposition which I made, I would not have been called upon to make any speech. Before I do that, I will make this preliminary remark, that for five years back I have been exceedingly anxious for the call of a convention. I discovered that great abuses had crept into our government—very great abuses—especially in the appointing power, and in the language of the many to the few, always stealing away from the many to the few, and that it has been emphatically stealing away from the people of Kentucky; and like boys playing "cat or cry ball," when the ball is lost they stop and cry "lost ball." I was ready, for one, to start a meeting and call in view, in advocating the call of a convention. I felicitate myself will be fully attained, and that is that the appointing power will be restored to the people where it originally and of right belongs. When that is accomplished, I will vote in favor of anything that this house may be disposed to insert in the constitution. I did not like from the start the proposition that is now before this committee, and I hope I may be indulged while I recapitulate the new and substantial provisions contained in the constitution. I go along with the proposition that some of the objects I have to them. The first principle is that the judges shall be elected by the people; I heartily go for that. The next proposition is substantially, that the judges shall not be removed by address in any case that is the subject of impeachment, and I heartily wedded to my opinion. The next great principle is, that it shall require a vote of two thirds to remove a judge. Well, sir, I am against that, as I intimated to the

house a week or two ago; yet that would not be a *sine qua non* with me, if I could get some other alterations made. I want—whether it be a majority or two thirds of the legislature, that shall pass a resolution, that the governor shall veto of the resolution shall be *no facto*, the removal of the judge, and that the governor shall have no hand in it afterwards; because if we were to pass a resolution, unless there was some provision of that kind inserted, he would veto it, and there is no provision by which we can pass the resolution, his veto notwithstanding. It will be remembered by delegates in this house that the legislature of Pennsylvania attempted to address a judge out, and the words employed in their constitution were, “the governor may remove.” The legislature passed the resolution by a large majority of both houses and laid it before the governor. He refused to remove the individual, and the legislature entered upon the labor of expostulation. They contended that the word “may” was synonymous in the sense in which we use the word “shall.” I shall not give the governor returned this insolent answer: “You say the word “may” means “shall;” I say it means “I will not.” He then went on and said, “You do those things which you ought not to do, and you leave undone those things which you ought to do, and there is no health in you.” That was the language of the governor of Penn-

I am in favor, whether you require a vote of two thirds or three fifths or a bare majority, of removing the individual without the intervention of the governor at all. The governor has no hand in the election of a judge, except by his vote as a private individual, and I am not for applying to him, as governor, to sanction

Well sir, I am willing that the eight year principle shall be retained in the bill, provided you introduce in it the principle of ineligibility after that time. If they are to be re-eligible, let their terms be as in Mississippi, for but four years; and let the re-eligibility only continue for two terms. But I would prefer a term of eight years, with ineligibility for at least four, five, six, or eight years more.

I do not know that the court of appeals would be placed in a position in which they may exercise any undue influence upon the voters. But take the circuit courts—and I imagine that we are to have twelve judicial districts, embracing perhaps eight or ten counties each, in which the judges would be elected by the people—said voters—and imagine to yourself a judge on the bench, who is looking, if you please, for a re-election. Imagine to yourself that he has the life of some member of a powerful and influential family in his hands, or the liberties of another member of a family of that description—imagine to yourself that he is looking out before him—and I ask you if that is not a power that cannot be resisted for one moment? What lawyer in the state can come in competition with him? None, none sir! I am in favor of a man, when he comes before the people, coming without the black cloak of a judge upon him. I am opposed to re-eligibility, and I want to have the right of the people to elect a judge on a principle carried out in this bill, with some other alterations. I would forego the proposition that I now make. I am making these propositions, because, take this bill as a whole, I do not like its provisions. I do not like the proposition for four judges. I have no recollection of any case in which four judges, except in that celebrated court called the new court, have collected very well that when I took the stump against that famous court, of all the weapons that I used that was the most powerful, except that of John Trimble's woman's saddle which I put in the mortgage. I have a deep-rooted prejudice against four judges, and I will state the reason. The circuit judges, if I please, are to be elected on a principle of law. It comes up to the court of appeals. The four judges stand two to two in their opinions, and the decision below is sustained, because they are equally divided. Well, a case comes up in which the circuit judge has taken an opposite opinion; the court is divided, and the case is sent back. I have seen a beautiful uniformity of decision. Give us then a number that can agree; take three, five, seven, nine, or eleven, if you want to give us a number that can never be equally divided; but three judges have done our business very well for the last twenty or thirty years, I believe. I have seen no fault to find with the court of appeals, and it was fairly elected by the people. The governor was the appointing power. I want to give it to the people. Next, I always thought there was something of indecent hurry and haste in the manner in which these judges discharge their business. The higher court of the state should do its business with something like the gravity and deliberation of the court of business has been accomplished in one hundred days of one year. And the moment they accomplish it they hurry off to accomplish other business—some to lecture on law, some to do one thing and some another. I do not know that I shall offer an amendment, or that it is practicable to make any alteration on that point. I am not going to ask the court some \$1500, at least—\$2000 if we fix the salary at that sum.

I am again branching the court. Branching the court will make it necessary to have four clerks, four clerk's offices, four clerk's records, four different sets of all the machinery attending the court. That will swell the expenses, perhaps, thirty times all together. Some say that if you have an objection to some law, where are you to locate these four branches? If you leave it to the legislature, it will be a bone of contention eternally. And when they are located, it will perhaps be in places where there are not to be found five law books. At all events they may be located at places where the business of appeals cannot be obtained. Well how many days will these branches have to sit? And how many terms are they to hold? Will they have four terms? If so, how many weeks and days will they sit at each? Say eight weeks, and I will soon show you that that will do. There will be four clerks, four clerk's records, four clerk's offices, at the expense of the state; there will also be four men to wait on the court, four men to make the fires, and God knows how much additional machinery will be required in these courts. But the great objection is this—will they in any term in the year be able to do the business of the court? Will you take it if you divide the business of the court into four appeals into four parts the judges can do the business. But do you not know, and I appeal to every lawyer in this house, that if you divide it the business will be doubled and trebled. Did it take a neighborhood where there were no court house within twenty miles? How peaceable, and quiet, and civilly disposed towards each other they were. Make a new county and bring a court house to their doors, and every man begins to pull his neighbors hair for the sake of a lawsuit, and the peace is all gone. Bring up a branch to any place, and I can assure you that I can point out some five lawyers that can take more business to the court than it can do in that part of the year allotted to it. In Mississippi—I went there in 1837 and 1838 with a view of practicing there—it was known that the legislature would divide the business with a set of rules to sign; and it was a regulation of fees, such as a per centage for collecting, and a half per cent. for getting continuances. Now a great deal of the business will be exactly of this kind. You double and treble the business, and throw into the lot, where it only sits once a year, and you have a lawsuit going on in every hand. It will soon be found that the great business of the lawyers will be to get the fees by continuances.

I recollect that when I practised in Green, a



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 **INSURANCE.**   
THE LEXINGTON FIRE, LIFE AND MAR-  
INE INSURANCE COMPANY.  
CHARTERED IN 1836.  
**CAPITAL--\$300,000.**  
WILL insure Buildings, Furniture, Merchandise, &c.

The lives of Slaves are also insured by this Company.  
 H. I. TODD, Agent.  
 Office at Todd & Crittenden's Counting Room.  
 May 22, 1849—867-tf

**Protection Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.**

**T**HE undersigned will issue policies on every description of Buildings and Goods, Wares and Merchandise, contained therein, against loss or damage by Fire, and on the cargoes of Steam Boats, against the perils

of the sea and lakes, on the most favorable terms.

The high reputation of this Company for the prompt and satisfactory manner in which all losses are adjusted and paid, in connection with the low rates of premium, offer great inducements to such as wish to insure.

H. WINGATE, *Agent.*

August 10. 1847—774-1f.

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**LIFE INSURANCE.**

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**Insurance Company, in the City of New York**  
Passed April 5th, 1849.

SEC. 1. *The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows.* The Nautilus Insurance Company shall hereafter be known as the **Nautilus Insurance Company.**

SEC. 2. The business of the said Company shall be confined to insurance on lives, and it may make all and every insurance appertaining to life, and receive and execute trusts, make endowments, and grant and purchase annuities.

SEC. 3. At the election for Trustees, each insured member for any sum paid in or secured as a premium of insur-

election, shall have one vote, either in person, or by proxy, duly signed by the person effecting such insurance; and every person holding a certificate or certificates of the Company, (not discharged by payment of losses,) to the amount of one hundred dollars, shall also be entitled to one vote, and for every additional hundred dollars one vote, in the same manner.

two hundred thousand dollars, the notes given for premiums in advance, may be given up to be cancelled.

SEC. 5. The officers of this Company, within one month subsequent to the first day of January, in each year, shall cause an estimate to be made of the profits and true state of the affairs of the said Company, as near as may be, for the preceding year; and all such dividends as may be declared by the Trustees, shall be placed to the

the Company and each person so entitled may receive a certificate therefor. No certificate, however, shall be issued for any sum less than ten dollars. Such dividend certificates to contain a proviso that the amount named therein is liable for any loss by said Company. The Trustees may, at their discretion, declare or pay interest on such certificates at a rate not exceeding six per cent.

SEC. 6. The statement required to be made by the accounting officer of said Company, passed April 18, 1843, shall hereafter be made within thirty days after the first day of January in each year.

During the year ending April 16th, 1849, 1,821 policies

Amount paid for salaries, fees to  
Physicians and Trustees, Clerk  
hire, &c., \$7,761 45

ing, Stationery, Furniture, Interest on guaranteed capital, &c., &c.	7,239 23
Amount paid to Agents, for Commissions, State Taxes, Medical Examinations, Exchange, &c.,	13,384 00
	<hr/> \$24,623 23

Losses by Death, less discounts for payments in advance of the 60 days	39,949 59	64,324 2
Nett Balances of Premiums for the year,	\$77,856 7	
ASSETS.		
Cash on hand,	9,369 2	

United States and New York State Stocks,	11,000 00
Bonds and Mortgages,	
Notes received for 40 per cent. of premium on Life Policies,	45,761 80
Premiums on Policies in the hands of Agents, Policies on hand not yet delivered, and quarterly payments on first year's premiums.	6,713 30
Amount of Premiums charged against subscribers' notes due May 4, 1849,	2,717 80
	4,083 30

In addition to which, the Company holds subscription notes, the remainder of guarantee capital unused by premiums,	\$165,937 6
Amount liable for losses	29,151 6
<i>Number of New Policies Issued</i>	\$203,089 3

First year,	-	-	-	-	-	449
Second year,	-	-	-	-	-	632
Third year,	-	-	-	-	-	796
Fourth year	-	-	-	-	-	1821
						<hr/>
Whole number of Policies issued	-	-	-	-	-	2618
Amount of Premiums, first year,	-	-	-	-	-	\$22,622
do do second year,	-	-	-	-	-	41,746

do do fourth year, - -	142,191
Premiums for four years, - -	\$278,937
From which deduct amount of disbursements for four years, - -	112,200
Balance of premiums above disbursements, \$165,937	

The Board of Trustees have this day declared a Dividend of \$165,937

They have likewise declared an interest of Six per cent on the amount of previous dividends, payable in cash.

MORRIS FRANKLIN, *President.*  
 SPENCER S. BENEDICT, *Vice President.*

**The rates of insurance on One Hundred Dollars**

Age.	One Year.	Seven Years.	For Life.
15	77	88	1 36
20	91	95	1 77

30	1 31	1 36	2 36
35	1 35	1 53	2 95
40	1 69	1 83	3 20
45	1 91	1 96	3 73
50	1 96	2 09	4 60
55	2 32	3 21	5 74
60	3 35	4 91	7 00

For policies granted for the whole term of life, when the premium therefor amounts to \$50—a note for 40 per cent with interest at 6 per cent.—*without guaranty*, may be received in part payment, or it may be paid in cash in which case it is expected, should the party survive, to make 13 annual payments, leaving the dividends to accumulate—the policy will be fully paid for, and the accumulation ultimately added to the policy.

are divided annually among them, whether the policy is to be issued for a limited period or for the whole term of life, a feature unknown in the charter of any other Mutual Life Insurance Company incorporated by this State.

For further information, the public are referred to the pamphlets, and forms of proposal, which may be obtained at the office of the Company, or any of its Agents.

The undersigned having been appointed Agent for the above Government, is desirous to take risks on lives.

low as any office in the East or West.  
 IF Applications from the country (post paid) will promptly attended to.  
 IF Losses adjusted in this town without delay.  
 IF Office at the Frankfort Branch Bank.  
 H. WINGATE, Agent.  
 Dr. Lewis Sneed, Medical Examiner.  
 Frankfort, Ky. June 15, 1849. 870-b

**Removal.**  
THE POST OFFICE has been removed to the S. E. corner of Broadway and Lewis streets, in the building occupied by B. F. Johnson.  
B. F. JOHNSON, P. M.  
Frankfort, August 7, 1849-878-1f

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**For Sale.**

**3** DOZ. Corn Knives, of Scythe material, on hand and  
for sale by **TODD & CRITTENDEN.**  
Sept. 11.